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Overconfidently underthinking: Narcissism negatively predicts cognitive 
reflection 
Abstract 
There exists a large body of work examining individual differences in the propensity to 
engage in reflective thinking processes. However, there is a distinct lack of empirical 
research examining the role of dispositional factors in these differences and understanding 
these associations could provide valuable insight into decision-making. Here we examine 
whether individual differences in cognitive reflection are related to narcissism (excessive 
self-focused attention) and impulsiveness (trait-based lack of inhibitory control). 
Participants across three studies completed measures of narcissism, impulsiveness and 
cognitive reflection. Results indicate that grandiose and vulnerable narcissists differ in their 
performance on problem-solving tasks (i.e., CRT) and preferences for intuitive thinking, as 
well as the degree to which they reflect on and understand their own thoughts and enjoy 
cognitively effortful activities. Additionally, though impulsiveness was significantly 
related to self-report measures of cognitive reflection (i.e., metacognitive reflection, 
metacognitive insight, and Need for Cognition), it showed no association with a 
behavioural measure of cognitive reflection (i.e., CRT scores). Our results suggest that 
certain individual differences in dispositional and personality characteristics may play 
important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in certain forms of reflective 
thinking. 
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Introduction 
Though people often rely, with varying degrees of success, on heuristic thinking and intuitive 
“gut feelings” when making decisions (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), some people show a disposition for slower, more thoughtful deliberation – commonly 
known as cognitive reflection (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015). To date, much of the 
research on cognitive reflection has focused mainly on characterizing its cognitive and 
behavioural correlates. For example, propensity to engage in cognitive reflection is associated 
with a decreased susceptibility to both pseudo-profound bullshit (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, 
Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015) and partisan fake news headlines (Pennycook & Rand, 2018). In 
addition, a greater propensity to be reflective is positively associated with cognitive ability 
(Frederick, 2005) and logical reasoning (Pennycook, Cheyene, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2013). 
Through understanding the factors associated with cognitive reflection, we have come to a 
deeper understanding of both the basic mechanisms supporting it and the diverse ways in which 
it colours our day-to-day cognitive lives. This general approach, however, has largely ignored 
how more traditional dispositional traits (e.g., personality) might contribute to the propensity to 
cognitively reflect. This seems a missed opportunity as a number of personality traits appear to 
overlap conceptually with the propensity to reflect and, by examining these potential links, we 
could come to a deeper understanding of both cognitive reflection and personality (e.g., Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).  The present investigation takes a step in this 
direction by examining how two such traits, narcissism and impulsiveness, relate to the 
propensity to reflect, broadly speaking, on our cognitions. 
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Dual process theories 
One of the oldest ideas in cognitive research - and the current dominant model in the reasoning 
literature - is that we rely on two types of thinking: one that is fast, automatic, associative, and 
intuitive and another that is slower, analytic, rational, and reflective (e.g., Kahneman, 2003; 
Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Sloman, 1996; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Dual process theory (DPT) 
provides a useful framework for conceptualizing these differences by distinguishing between 
Type I (intuitive) thinking, which is autonomous and does not require working memory, and 
Type II (reflective) thinking that is cognitively decoupled and utilizes working memory 
(Stanovich & West, 2013). For example, most models suggest that when a person encounters a 
stimulus, characteristics of that stimulus may cue intuitive, affective, or heuristic Type I 
responses that are acted on quickly (i.e., “going with your gut”) but can be overridden by slower, 
more deliberative Type II rationalizing (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015). The degree to 
which these cognitively reflective Type II processes will be engaged can be influenced by top-
down factors such as congruency of the stimulus information (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & 
Koehler, 2015), metacognitive confidence that the intuitive response is correct (i.e., Feeling of 
Rightness; Thompson, Prowser Turner, & Pennycook, 2011), and time allotted to process the 
information before making a decision (Strack & Deutsch, 2004).  
Dual processing and individual differences in personality 
As noted above, the bulk of dual processing research has focused on various cognitive and 
behavioural correlates of the propensity to engage in Type II reflective thinking (e.g., Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Noori, 2016). Research in personality and social psychology, however, has 
demonstrated the utility of relating these dual processes to personality variables (e.g., Petty & 
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Cacioppo, 1986; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). For example, a Type I, intuitive thinking style has 
been positively linked to emotional expressivity as well as the Big Five personality traits 
extraversion and agreeableness (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 
1999), while a reflective thinking style has been positively associated with the Big Five traits 
openness and conscientiousness and negatively related to neuroticism (Pacini & Epstein, 1999; 
Sadowski & Cogburn, 1997).  
When considering the dual process framework in the context of work on personality 
traits, several theoretically interesting intersections present themselves. In the present research 
we focus on narcissism and impulsiveness. First, higher levels of narcissism are characterized by 
domineering, excessive egocentrism and self-admiration with two commonly recognized sub-
types: 1) grandiose narcissism, expressed through grandiosity, entitlement, aggression, 
superiority, and self-enhancement and; 2) vulnerable narcissism, which is more insecure, 
introverted, hypersensitive, and defensive (Jauk, Weigle, Lehmann, Benedek, & Neubauer, 2017; 
Miller, Lynam, Hyatt, & Campbell, 2017). Additionally, narcissism appears to share 
characteristics associated with cognitive reflection (e.g., Grijalva & Zhang, 2016; Miller et al, 
2009; Vazire & Funder, 2006). Engaging in cognitive reflection seemingly (and expressly in 
many of the models discussed above) requires a level of inward criticality that might be less 
available in individuals higher in narcissism, particularly given their propensity for biased 
introspection and exaggerated self-assessment (Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2011; Morf & 
Rhodewalt, 2001). For example, inhibiting a fast, intuitive response requires a willingness to 
consider our minds as fallible and, in particular, capable of generating incorrect responses. That 
individuals higher in narcissism lack this capability (or the willingness to engage it) draws some 
support from the relations between narcissism and overconfidence (Macenczak, Campbell, 
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Henley, & Campbell, 2016), feelings of intellectual superiority (Gabriel, Critellis, and Ee, 1994), 
distorted self-insight (Carlson, 2013; Grijalva & Zhang, 2016), and biased reasoning (Freis, 
Brown, Carroll, & Arkin, 2015). When narcissism is viewed within a dual processing 
framework, it reflects a disposition toward decreased engagement in Type II processes (i.e., 
cognitive reflection). 
Decreased engagement in cognitive reflection also appears to share deep similarities with 
trait impulsiveness. For example, trait impulsiveness reflects a proclivity toward reacting to 
internal and external stimuli in ways that are rapid, unplanned, and with little thought given to 
the consequences (Moeller, Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz, & Swann, 2001). Consistent with this 
description, impulsivity has been associated with a number of variables putatively related to the 
tendency to engage in cognitively reflective activities such as increased risk-taking (Kahn, 
Kaplowitz, Goodman, & Emans, 2002) and poorer probabilistic decision-making (Cáceres & San 
Martin, 2017). As with narcissism, when viewed through a dual processing lens, impulsive 
individuals can be appropriately described as having a propensity to avoid engaging in cognitive 
reflection. In the present investigation we sought to examine these potential relations using a 
broad swath of measures of cognitive reflection. 
Dimensions of Cognitive Reflection 
The construct of cognitive reflection can be approached from various directions. Recent research 
in dual processing theory has focused on individual differences in behavioural performance on 
problem-solving tasks as an indicator of propensity to engage in Type II, reflective thinking 
processes. The most widely used behavioural measure of reflective thinking is the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005). The original CRT comprises three logical reasoning 
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questions designed to elicit intuitive, incorrect responses that immediately jump to mind or 
reflective, correct responses which require more thoughtful engagement and intentional 
deliberation. Consider the following example: 
A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the 
ball cost? 
Many people quickly and confidently give the intuitive, but incorrect, answer of 10 cents, 
never aware that a better alternative exists. Many others, however, give the correct answer of 5 
cents, which generally requires a more thoughtful, reflective approach. Research has shown that 
these more reflective CRT responders not only arrive at the correct answer, but are also aware of 
the intuitive, incorrect response and, realizing that it is wrong, deliberate further until arriving at 
the best solution (Mata, Ferreria, & Sherman, 2013). Additionally, though it is one of the most 
frequently used measures of analytic thinking (thus, potentially at an increased risk of diminished 
effectiveness from overexposure), CRT performance has been shown to be relatively stable 
across time (Stagnaro, Pennycook, & Rand, 2018) and its associations with other cognitive 
reflection variables have been shown to be robust to multiple exposures (Bialek & Pennycook, 
2017). 
In addition to the CRT’s behavioural approach to measuring engagement in cognitive 
reflection, there also exist dispositional measures of reflective thinking. For instance, Pacini and 
Epstein (1999) developed the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) to distinguish individual 
differences in preferences for intuitive-experiential processing (“Faith in Intuition”) and analytic-
rational processing (“Need for Cognition”). People who favour a “Faith in Intuition” thinking 
style are more spontaneous, quick to trust others, and more likely to make decisions based on 
“gut feelings” or instinct (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
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Conversely, a person who favours a “Need for Cognition” thinking style is said to be better able 
to resist impulsive behaviour, tends to enjoy engaging in challenging mental tasks, and takes 
more time to mentally strategize when solving problems (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).  
Another important aspect of reflective thinking that has gained traction of late is the 
metacognitive activity represented by self-reflection and insight, as measured by the Self-
Reflection and Insight Scale (SRIS; Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002). To keep our 
terminology consistent, we refer to these concepts as metacognitive reflection and metacognitive 
insight throughout this paper. Metacognitive reflection describes the need and frequency with 
which one analyzes and evaluates his or her thoughts, feelings, and behaviours. Likewise, 
metacognitive insight represents the degree to which one clearly understands the thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviours they have reflected on (Grant, 2001). Put another way, metacognitive 
reflection represents one’s self-reported engagement in cognitive reflection whereas 
metacognitive insight represents one’s self-reported clarity in understanding the components and 
outcomes of that reflection. These metacognitive processes are thought to be centrally important 
in modulating purposeful cognitive and behavioural change and have been associated with 
increased self-regulation, motivation, job performance, and subjective well-being (Lyke, 2009; 
Roberts & Stark, 2008; Silvia & Philips, 2011).  
While each of these constructs assesses cognitive reflection in a different way and, to 
date, have largely been examined separately, they nevertheless potentially index aspects of the 
same core construct. Thus, to understand the relations among narcissism, trait impulsiveness, and 
cognitive reflection, we examined each of these different dimensions of reflective thinking. Not 
only does this allow us to develop a more diverse understanding of any such relations with 
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narcissism and trait impulsiveness, it also provides the opportunity to better understand the 
relations between these various measures of cognitive reflection. 
Present Investigation 
Here, we report three large sample size studies investigating the relation between narcissism, 
impulsiveness, and cognitive reflection, broadly construed. In Study 1 and Study 2a, we assess 
two types of narcissism – grandiose and vulnerable – and trait impulsiveness in relation to 
measures of five dimensions of cognitive reflection: engagement in cognitive reflection (as 
measured by the CRT), self-reported engagement in reflection (i.e., metacognitive reflection), 
metacognitive insight, Need for Cognition, and Faith in Intuition. In Study 2b, we repeat these 
assessments while also examining associations with a measure of overconfidence in cognitive 
ability. Given the above, narcissism and impulsiveness should be negatively related to measures 
of cognitive reflection (i.e., CRT, metacognitive reflection, metacognitive insight, and Need for 




One hundred participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and paid $5 
each for their participation. Selection was restricted to participants in the United States who had 
a 95% MTurk HIT (Human Intelligence Task) approval rating.  
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Materials 
Participants completed the following measures in randomized order: 
Narcissism Personality Inventory.  
Grandiose narcissism was measured using the 13-item, forced-choice version of the Narcissism 
Personality Inventory (NPI-13; Gentile, Miller, Hoffman, Reidy, Zeichner, & Campbell, 2013). 
The NPI-13 measures the extent to which a person’s self-concept is marked by entitlement, 
dominance, and self-aggrandizement. It demonstrated good internal reliability when originally 
validated (α = .82) and contains items such as, “I find it easy to manipulate people” and “I like 
having authority over other people.” 
Hypersensitive Narcissism Scale.  
Vulnerable narcissism was assessed with the 10-item Hypersensitive Narcissism Scale (HSNS; 
Hendin & Cheek, 1997). The HSNS measures a type of narcissism that in some individuals is 
associated with hypersensitivity, feelings of shame, and desire for approval rather than with 
grandiosity. Items are rated on 5-point Likert scale and include statements like, “My feelings are 
easily hurt by ridicule or the slighting remarks of others.” Hendin and Cheek (1997) reported an 
average reliability of α =.71 across four samples in their original validation study. 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale.  
Impulsiveness was assessed with the 30-item Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, 
Stanford, and Barratt, 1995). The BIS-11 measures a self-reported pattern of behaviour reflecting 
quick, unplanned reactions to stimuli accompanied by a decreased sensitivity to the negative 
consequences of such disinhibitory actions (Moeller et al, 2001). Participants used a 4-point 
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frequency scale (1=Rarely, 4=Almost always) to rate themselves according to items such as, “I 
do things without thinking.” The BIS-11 comprises three subscales that can be scored 
individually or as a composite score. To capture overall dispositional impulsiveness, we used the 
overall composite score in our analyses. When originally created, the BIS-11 showed good 
average internal reliability (α = .81, across four samples).  
Cognitive Reflection Test – Long (CRT-L).  
To assess propensity to engage in analytic thinking processes, participants completed the 
Cognitive Reflection Test – Long (CRT-L; Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati, & Hamilton, 2016). 
The CRT-L is a measure of one’s ability to inhibit quick, intuitive responses and engage in 
reflective, analytic thinking when solving problems (Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014). It consists of 
3 mathematical word problems from Frederick’s (2005) original CRT and 3 items added by 
Primi et al (2016). The CRT-L showed an acceptable average reliability of α = .74 across three 
samples when originally constructed. 
Rational-Experiential Inventory.  
Intuitive thinking (α = .87 in the original sample), which encompass one’s preference for 
utilizing intuitive, “gut feelings” when making decisions, was assessed using the REI’s 20-item 
Experiential subscale (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), commonly referred to as Faith in Intuition (FI). 
Participants answered questions such as, and “I believe in trusting my hunches,” by rating them 
according to a 5-point Likert scale. 
Participants’ preference for engaging in effortful cognitive endeavours, or Need for 
Cognition (NFC), was assessed using the 20-item Rationality subscale of Pacini and Epstein’s 
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(1999) Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI). Participants rated statements about themselves 
such as, “I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking” on a 5-point Likert scale. Pacini 
and Epstein (1999) reported excellent reliability (α = .90) for the NFC scale when it was 
constructed. 
Self-Reflection and Insight Scale.  
Twelve items from Grant, Franklin, and Langford’s (2002) 20-item Self-Reflection and Insight 
Scale (SRIS) were used to measure metacognitive reflection (MR), which describes the self-
reported need and propensity to metacognitively reflect on and evaluate one’s thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviours. Participants used a 6-point scale to rate themselves on items such as, “I 
frequently take time to reflect on my thoughts.” The remaining 8-items measured metacognitive 
insight (MI), which is the degree to which a person clearly understands his or her thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviours. Participants used the same 6-point scale to rate themselves on items 
such as, “Thinking about my thoughts makes me more confused.” Both scales showed excellent 
reliability in Grant, Franklin, and Langford’s (2002) original validation research (MR, α = .91; 
MI, α = .87). 
Procedure 
The survey was developed and managed through Qualtrics online survey platform and 
participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) website. Participants were 
presented with an informed consent page to read and agree to before responding to the survey. 
Demographics questions consisted of age (“Please enter your age”) and gender (“What is your 
gender”). Finally, participants completed the remaining survey scales, which were presented in 
NARCISSISM, IMPULSIVENESS, AND COGNITIVE REFLECTION 13 
   
 
random order. The survey concluded with an informational feedback form which contained 
researcher contact information if participants desired future communication. The survey took 
approximately 20 minutes to complete.  
Results 
Table 1 lists descriptive statistics and Pearson’s r-values for all variables. Linear regression 
models were created to test the predictive value of narcissism (grandiose and vulnerable) and 
impulsiveness for each of the cognitive reflection measures (see Table 2). Mahalanobis distances 
were calculated and revealed no outliers. We focus our discussion of the results first on 
informative bivariate correlations followed by the linear regression analyses. All data for this and 
Study 2a and 2b were analyzed using SPSS (version 25). 
Bivariate Correlations  
Grandiose narcissism was significantly and negatively associated with only one of our cognitive 
reflection measures; CRT scores, r(98) = -.21, p =.04. Vulnerable narcissism was negatively 
correlated with both metacognitive insight, r(98) = -.45, p < .01, and Need for Cognition, r(98) = 
-.32, p < .01, and positively associated with metacognitive reflection, r(98) = .19, p = .054 , 
though this latter relation was only marginally significant. The intercorrelations between our 
predictors revealed that vulnerable narcissism and impulsiveness were correlated, r(98) = .40, p 
< .001, while grandiose narcissism was not significantly correlated with either vulnerable 
narcissism, r(98) = .12, p = .23, or impulsiveness, r(98) = .07, p = .50.  
Turning to the intercorrelations between the cognitive reflection variables, metacognitive 
reflection was significantly correlated with Need for Cognition, r(98) = .29, p = .004; and Faith 
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in Intuition, r(98) = .22, p = .03. Metacognitive insight was also significantly correlated with 
Need for Cognition, r(98) = .31, p = .002; and Faith in Intuition, r(98) = .26, p < .01. CRT scores 
were only significantly correlated with Faith in Intuition, r(98) = -.34, p < .001.  
 
(Insert Table 1) 
Regressions 
We next created separate multiple linear regression models with each of our cognitive reflection 
measures (i.e., CRT, metacognitive reflection, metacognitive insight, need for cognition, and 
faith in intuition) as outcomes predicted by both narcissism measures and impulsiveness. Table 2 




Multiple linear regressions for each cognitive reflection outcome variable 









Grandiose narcissism  -.21* -.01 -.00  .06  .05 
Vulnerable narcissism  .05  .21     -.28** -.11 -.15 
Impulsiveness -.09  -.03     -.42**     -.54** -.05 
Adjusted R2 .02 .00 .33 .33 .00 
F 1.75a 1.27a 17.53** 17.34** 1.04a 
Note: N = 100. Standardized beta coefficients listed. CRT-L = Cognitive Reflection Test - Long;     
a denotes overall model is non-significant. **p < .01; *p < .05 
 
Narcissism  
Grandiose narcissism significantly and negatively predicted CRT scores, β = -.21, p = .04. 
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Vulnerable narcissism significantly and negatively predicted metacognitive insight, β = -.28, p = 
.002. Additionally, while vulnerable narcissism trended toward positively predicting 
metacognitive reflection, the significance of this association was marginal, β = .21, p = .06. No 
other cognitive reflection variables were significantly predicted by either narcissism measure, all 
βs < .15, all ps > .17. 
Impulsiveness  
Impulsiveness significantly predicted both metacognitive insight, β = -.42, p < .01, and Need for 
Cognition, β = -.54 p < .01. No other cognitive reflection variables were significantly predicted 
by impulsiveness, βs < .09, all ps > .43. 
Discussion 
Consistent with our hypothesis, grandiose narcissism was a significant negative predictor of CRT 
scores. That is, individuals higher in grandiose narcissism were more likely to rely on the more 
intuitive response when problem-solving. Additionally, vulnerable narcissism significantly and 
negatively predicted metacognitive insight. In other words, people higher in vulnerable 
narcissism feel like they have less clarity in understanding their own thoughts. Also as expected, 
there were significant associations between the different cognitive reflection variables. Overall, 
the self-report measures correlated more strongly with one another than they did with the CRT. 
Indeed, Faith in Intuition, was the only self-report reflection measure to show an association 
(negative) with the CRT. 
However, contrary to expectations, grandiose narcissism did not significantly predict any 
self-report measures of cognitive reflection. Additionally, vulnerable narcissism showed no 
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relation to CRT performance and its ability to positively predict metacognitive reflection was 
non-significant. Surprisingly, impulsiveness did not predict CRT scores but individuals scoring 
higher in impulsiveness did score lower on metacognitive insight and Need for Cognition. Thus, 
individuals scoring higher in impulsiveness were not more likely to rely on more impulsive, 
intuitive responses though they did report experiencing less clarity from their self-reflection and 
less enjoyment from engaging in intellectually reflective activities. A thorough discussion of the 
implications of the relations found (and not) will be taken up following Study 2a and 2b.  
Studies 2a and 2b 
In Experiment 2a and 2b we replicated and extended Study 1 with a larger sample. This was 
important given that, in many cases, the reported associations are the first to be reported in the 
literature. In addition, some of the associations were small, thus a larger sample would provide a 
clearer picture of the relations between measures.  
Additionally, previous research has found significant associations between measures of 
cognitive reflection and cognitive ability. For instance, some researchers have suggested that the 
CRT and measures of numeracy are largely isomorphic (Sinayev & Peters, 2011; Welsh, Burns, 
& Delfabbro, 2013), while other researchers have consistently found that CRT scores remain 
uniquely predictive for various outcomes after controlling for cognitive ability, including 
numeracy (Bialek & Domurat, 2018; Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Pennycook & Ross, 2016). 
Therefore, in order to ensure that we better isolated the relations between narcissism and our 
measures of cognitive reflection, we added measures of numeracy and verbal intelligence as 
covariates in Studies 2a and 2b. This allows for a clearer consideration of the cognitive reflection 
measures (i.e., as measures of a propensity to reflect as opposed to the ability to do so) and our 
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expectations were that the negative associations between narcissism, impulsiveness, and 
cognitive reflection found in Study 1 would remain in Study 2a and Study 2b after controlling for 
these cognitive ability measures.  
Lastly, previous work has shown significant relations between narcissism and 
overconfidence (Macenczaka, Campbell, Henley, & Campbell, 2016) and CRT scores and 
overconfidence (Bialek & Domurat, 2016; Noori, 2016). Crucially, research has found that 
individuals who score higher on the CRT demonstrate greater accuracy in self-assessment 
(Hoppe & Kusterer, 2011). Viewing these previous research findings in relation to our own 
results from Study 1, this led us to predict a positive association between narcissism and 
overconfidence. Therefore, in Study 2b, we had participants indicate their level of confidence 
that the answers they gave to the cognitive ability items were correct which, when contrasted 
with their objective performance, provided a measure of overconfidence (i.e., calibration). This 
offered a measure of participants’ metacognitive ability (i.e., the accuracy with which they can 
assess their cognitive performance), which provided an opportunity to investigate an aspect of 
cognitive reflection not captured by our other measures. 
Method 
Participants 
Based on an a priori power analysis using results from Study 1, the goal was to achieve 
approximately .80 power to detect an effect of r = .20 at α = .05 (g*power; Erdfelder, Faul, & 
Buchner, 1996). Therefore, two hundred participants were recruited for Study 2a and two 
hundred two for Study 2b via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participant recruitment procedures 
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and restriction criteria were identical to those of Study 1 with the additional restriction of 
excluding individuals who had participated in the previous study.  
Materials 
Participants completed all scales from Study 1 as well as the following additional measures1: 
Berlin Numeracy Test  
Participants also completed the 4-item Berlin Numeracy Test which assesses one’s ability to 
perform basic probability and mathematical operations (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & 
Garcia-Retamero, 2012). In Study 2b, participants also indicated their confidence, on a 0 to 100 
percent sliding scale, that their responses were correct.  
In study 2a, participants completed a multiple-choice version and in Study 2b they 
completed an open-ended version. While the original validation study of the Berlin Numeracy 
Test did not report alpha reliability for the multiple-choice (MC) version, the authors did report a 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability of .59 for the open-ended version and stated that the MC version 
was an acceptable substitute (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012). For 
Study 2a, the multiple-choice version demonstrated a low Cronbach’s alpha reliability of α =.57, 
therefore the response format was changed in Study 2b to the more traditional open-ended format 
 
1 Participants also completed the Big Five Mini Marker Scale (Saucier, 1994). Initially, this was included 
due to concerns about potential covariation. However, prevailing literature conceptualizes narcissism 
as a cluster of Five Factor Model (FFM) and other personality traits (Miller et al., 2010; Sherman et 
al., 2015). Thus, it was decided that including the Big Five variables in our model in addition to our 
narcissism measures which already account for these traits would be redundant. Therefore, Big Five 
Mini Marker results are not reported here and were not included in our model. 
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which yielded an acceptable internal reliability (α =.71). Other than response format, test items 
were identical in both versions.  
Wordsum 
To measure verbal intelligence, participants completed the 10-item version of the “Wordsum” 
test (Thorndike, 1942; Malhotra, Krosnick, & Haertel, 2007). Participants in Study 2b also 
indicated the likelihood of their response being correct. Each Wordsum item had five response 
options, so confidence scales ranged from 20 to 100, with selection of the 20% indicating that the 
participant’s answer to the item was a guess. 
For each item, participants were presented with a word and then asked to select from a 
list another word that most closely matches its meaning. For example, ALLUSION was 
presented with the words “reference,” “dream,” “eulogy,” “illusion,” and “aria.” Though 
Thorndike (1942) did not report a Cronbach’s reliability coefficient when the Wordsum was 
originally created, past research has shown it to have an acceptable reliability of α = .64 
(Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015).  
Results 
The following results are from analyses performed on the combined 2a and 2b data sets except 
where otherwise indicated. This gave us a large sample to consider (N = 402). Table 3 lists 
descriptive statistics and Pearson’s r-values for all variables. Descriptive statistics, bivariate 
correlations, and regression coefficients for the individual Study 2a and Study 2b data sets can be 
found in the supplementary materials.  
Mahalanobis distances were calculated revealing ten outliers which were excluded from 
the overall data set. Another 14 participants were excluded due to random response sets all 
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originating from the same geolocation. Reliability analyses for these data points revealed 
consistent negative alphas for all standardized scales (-.015 to -2.9), suggesting a strong 
possibility that these responses either came from “imposter” accounts utilizing VPS (“virtual 
private server”) technology or were generated from malicious computer-generated survey 
response software (Dennis, Goodson, & Pearson, 2018; Dupuis, Meier, & Cuneo, 2018). Thus, 
these participants were excluded from analysis, leaving data for 378 participants used in our final 
analyses.  
As in Study 1, we first briefly report the bivariate correlations followed by the regression 
analyses with narcissism and impulsiveness predicting the cognitive reflection variables (i.e., 
CRT, metacognitive reflection, metacognitive insight, Need for Cognition, Faith in Intuition) 
controlling for cognitive ability (i.e., numeracy and verbal intelligence). Lastly, we report the 
results of our analyses from Study 2b of the associations between narcissism, impulsiveness, and 
overconfidence.  
Bivariate correlations 
The bivariate correlations (Table 3) between the narcissism and impulsivity measures and the 
cognitive reflection measures are largely what would be expected given the Study 1 results with 
a few notable exceptions. Grandiose narcissism was significantly and negatively correlated with 
metacognitive insight, r(376) = -.22, p < .001, which was not the case in Study 1. Vulnerable 
narcissism was significantly and positively correlated with Faith in Intuition, r(376) = .15, p = 
.004.  
Impulsiveness was significantly and negatively correlated with CRT scores, r(376) = -
.26, p < .001, and metacognitive reflection, r(376) = -.27, p < .001, although these associations 
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were not significant in Study 1. Impulsiveness was significantly and positively correlated with 
Faith in Intuition, r(376) = .11, p = .04. which is consistent with results from Study 1.  
With respect to the intercorrelations between the cognitive reflection variables, CRT 
scores were significantly and positively related to metacognitive insight, r(376) = .27, p < .001, 
and Need for Cognition, r(376) = .36, p < .001, but were uncorrelated to those variables in Study 
1. Also, metacognitive insight was uncorrelated with Faith in Intuition, r(376) = .06, p = .27, 
which is inconsistent with Study 1, where it was positively and significantly related, r(98) = .26, 
p < .001.  
 
(Insert Table 3) 
Regressions 
We first replicated our regression analyses from Study 1 by creating separate multiple linear 
regression models with each of our cognitive reflection outcomes (i.e., CRT, self-reflection, 
insight, need for cognition, faith in intuition, confidence, overconfidence) predicted by both 
narcissism measures and our impulsiveness measure only. Our results were largely similar to 
what was found in Study 1, with the exception that impulsiveness was a significant predictor 
both of CRT scores, β = .20, p < .001, and metacognitive reflection, β = .41, p < .001, which was 
not the case in Study 1 (full results from this analysis can be found in Table S1 of the 
Supplementary Materials). 
We next created separate multiple linear regression models with each of our cognitive 
reflection outcomes (i.e., CRT, self-reflection, insight, need for cognition, faith in intuition, 
confidence, overconfidence) predicted by both narcissism measures and our impulsiveness 
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measure while controlling for numeracy and verbal intelligence. Standardized beta coefficients 
and model fit information for each regression analysis performed are listed in Table 4. 
 
Table 4  
Multiple linear regressions for each cognitive reflection outcome variable  





Faith in     
Intuition 
Predictor variables          
Grandiose narcissism -.05     .00     -.01          .21***   -.08      
Vulnerable narcissism   -.11*         .37***      -.19***         -.05           .15**   
Impulsiveness -.06         -.43***        -.45***    -.43*** -.00      
Covariates          
Numeracy       .47*** -.06              -.02         .14**   -.13*    
Verbal intelligence       .21*** -.02            .17***    .14**   -.15*    
Adjusted R2 .39    .17    .38    .38    .06    
F   48.67***   16.36***   46.52***   47.04***     5.96*** 
Note: N = 378. Standardized beta coefficients listed. CRT-L = Cognitive Reflection Test-Long;   
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
 
Narcissism  
Grandiose narcissism significantly and positively predicted Need for Cognition, β = .21, p < 
.001. While it significantly, negatively predicted CRT scores in Study 1, grandiose narcissism 
did not significantly predict CRT in the combined Study 2 data, β = .05, p = .25, once cognitive 
ability covariates were included in the model. This makes sense given the significant, negative 
bivariate correlation between narcissism and verbal intelligence, r(376) = -.35, p < .001, found in 
Study 2.  
Vulnerable narcissism significantly and negatively predicted CRT scores, β = -.11, p = 
.02. Vulnerable narcissism also significantly and positively predicted Faith in Intuition, β = .15, p 
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= .007, and metacognitive reflection, β = .37, p < .001, and negatively predicted metacognitive 
insight, β = -.19, p < .001. No other cognitive reflection variables were significantly predicted by 
either narcissism measure, all βs < .05, all ps > .18. 
Impulsiveness 
Impulsiveness was a significant, negative predictor of metacognitive reflection, β = -.43, p < 
.001; metacognitive insight, β = -.45, p < .001; and Need for Cognition, β = -.43, p < .001. No 
other cognitive reflection variables were significantly predicted by impulsiveness scores, all βs < 
.06, all ps > .17. 
Cognitive Ability 
Numeracy significantly and positively predicted CRT, β = .47, p < .001; and Need for Cognition, 
β = .14, p = .01. It also significantly and negatively predicted Faith in Intuition, β = -.13, p = .02. 
Verbal intelligence significantly, positively predicted CRT scores, β = .21, p < .001, 
metacognitive insight, β = .17, p < .001, and Need for Cognition, β = .14, p = .004, and 
negatively predicted Faith in Intuition, β = -.15, p = .01. Lastly, though not a focus of our main 
analyses, it is interesting to note that when considering our personality variables as predictors of 
cognitive ability, verbal intelligence was significantly and negatively predicted by grandiose 
narcissism, β = -.32, p < .001, and impulsiveness, β = -.22, p < .001, but numeracy was only 
significantly predicted by impulsiveness, β = -.20, p < .001. 
Overconfidence (Study 2b)  
In Study 2b, overconfidence scores were calculated using participants’ (N = 190) objective 
cognitive ability scores and their self-reported confidence ratings. Total raw scores on both the 
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Berlin Numeracy Test and the Wordsum were converted to percentages and then subtracted from 
the average confidence score for each test to give an index of overconfidence. A score of zero 
would indicate that a person’s metacognitive judgements are perfectly calibrated (i.e., non-
biased). Scores below zero indicate underconfidence while scores above zero indicate 
overconfidence.  
As with previous analyses, bivariate correlations and linear regression were used to 
investigate the relations among overconfidence and our other study variables of interest. We first 
focus on the notable bivariate correlations followed by a discussion of the regression analyses. 
Descriptives and r-values for narcissism, impulsiveness, and cognitive reflection variables with 
measures of overconfidence are listed in Table 5. 
Bivariate correlations 
Of our predictor variables, only grandiose narcissism was significantly and positively related to 
numeracy overconfidence, r(190) = -.29, p < .01, and verbal intelligence overconfidence, r(190)  
= -.29, p < .01. The intercorrelations between the cognitive reflection and overconfidence 
variables are also worth noting. Only CRT scores were negatively associated with both numeracy 
overconfidence, r(190) = -.27, p < .01, and verbal intelligence overconfidence, r(190) = -.29, p < 
.01. Metacognitive insight was significantly and positively correlated with overconfidence for 
verbal intelligence, r(190) = -.21, p < .01. However, no other cognitive reflection measure was 
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Table 5   
Study 2b descriptive and correlational data for 
overconfidence measures 






 M 12.74 10.09 
 SD 25.68 17.70 
 Correlations   
1 Grandiose narcissism     .27**    .38** 
2 Vulnerable narcissism  .05    .05    
3 Impulsiveness .10    .13    
4 CRT-L    -.27**    -.29**  
5 Metacognitive Reflection -.02      .02    
6 Metacognitive Insight -.13         -.21**  
7 Need for Cognition -.08     -.12     
8 Faith in Intuition  .00     .05    
9 Numeracy     -.65**     -.32**  
10 Verbal intelligence     -.43**     -.80**  
Note: N = 190. **p < .01; *p < .05  
 
Regressions 
We next created separate multiple linear regression models with overconfidence for both 
numeracy and verbal intelligence as outcomes predicted by our measures of narcissism and 
impulsiveness while controlling for numeracy scores and verbal intelligence scores. Standardized 
beta coefficients and model fit information can be found in Table 6.2 
 
 
2Removing the cognitive ability measure used to derive the overconfidence measure in each regression 
(e.g., numeracy score from the numeracy overconfidence regression) yielded the same pattern of 
results. 
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Table 6   
Multiple linear regressions for overconfidence predicted by 
narcissism and impulsiveness 




Predictor variables   
Grandiose narcissism      .19***       .15*** 
Vulnerable narcissism            .01      -.02       
Impulsiveness          -.09       -.07       
Covariates   
Numeracy      -.60*** .04      
Verbal intelligence -.11            -.78*** 
Adjusted R2 .47     .65     
F    34.20***    70.39*** 
Note: N = 190.  ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
Narcissism 
Only grandiose narcissism positively predicted overconfidence both for numeracy, β = .19, p < 
.001, and verbal intelligence, β = .15, p < .001.  
Impulsiveness  
Impulsiveness did not significantly predict either overconfidence measure. 
Discussion 
Consistent with predictions, higher grandiose narcissism predicted greater intellectual 
overconfidence, vulnerable narcissism predicted greater metacognitive reflection and less 
metacognitive insight, and impulsiveness negatively predicted metacognitive reflection, 
metacognitive insight, and Need for Cognition. In addition, while overall the results across 
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studies were consistent, there were exceptions. While the latter is to be expected given the much 
larger samples in Study 2 and the controlling of cognitive ability, it is nonetheless worth noting. 
Below we summarize the results of Study 2 together with Study 1, then discuss these results 
further in the General Discussion. 
In Study 2, like Study 1, grandiose narcissism did not predict metacognitive reflection, 
metacognitive insight, or Faith in Intuition. Likewise, grandiose narcissism significantly and 
negatively predicted CRT scores in Study 1 and Study 2, however this relation became non-
significant in Study 2 once cognitive ability was included in the model. In addition, the bivariate 
correlation between grandiose narcissism and CRT was negative across all samples. Thus, taken 
together, the general trend potentially suggests a negative association between grandiose 
narcissism and CRT scores, though it would clearly be small in magnitude and modulated by 
cognitive ability.  
Also inconsistent between studies was the relation between grandiose narcissism and 
Need for Cognition. Grandiose narcissism significantly, positively predicted Need for Cognition 
in Study 2 though this was not true for Study 1 (though the direction of the association was 
positive). Interestingly, the bivariate correlation between grandiose narcissism and Need for 
Cognition was not significant in either Study 1 or Study 2, suggesting that any relation between 
the variables at the bivariate level is being suppressed in the regression model. A follow-up 
analysis revealed that this apparent suppressor effect was due to vulnerable narcissism and 
impulsiveness. That is, if both vulnerable narcissism and impulsiveness are removed from the 
regression model in Study 2, the relation between grandiose narcissism and need for cognition 
disappears. However, if either is included (separately or together), the relation between grandiose 
narcissism and Need for Cognition becomes significant. It is not clear why this effect was 
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present in Study 2 but not Study 1, but it should be noted that in the latter study there was no 
relation between grandiose narcissism and vulnerable narcissism but there was in the former.  
Lastly, grandiose narcissism was the only consistent (positive) predictor across all 
cognitive ability overconfidence measures in Study 2b. This supports prior research 
demonstrating a link between narcissism and overconfidence (Macenczaka, Campbell, Henley, 
& Campbell, 2016) and, at least in the case of verbal intelligence overconfidence, makes sense 
given our finding that grandiose narcissism negatively predicted verbal intelligence. Thus, while 
individuals higher in grandiose narcissism appear more likely to report engaging in and enjoying 
intellectually reflective endeavours (Need for Cognition), they are also overconfident in their 
own intellectual performance. Additionally, though grandiose narcissists may be less likely to 
give reflective responses while solving problems (CRT), their levels of metacognitive reflection, 
insight, and intuitive thinking are unrelated to their narcissism. 
In both Study 1 and Study 2 vulnerable narcissism negatively predicted metacognitive 
insight and did not predict Need for Cognition. Vulnerable narcissism positively predicted 
metacognitive reflection in both studies though the relation was only marginally significant in 
Study 1 (p = .06). In Study 2, vulnerable narcissism emerged as a significant negative predictor 
of CRT performance. However, in Study 1, the association was nonsignificant and positive. 
Thus, like grandiose narcissism, if there is a relation between vulnerable narcissism and CRT it 
appears to be negative and small. Additionally, vulnerable narcissism was unrelated to 
overconfidence. Lastly, vulnerable narcissism’s most inconsistent result was its relation to Faith 
in Intuition. In Study 1 the relation was positive though not significant while in Study 2 it was 
negative and significant suggesting a difference between the samples. Taken together, this 
suggests that while people who are more vulnerably narcissistic report engaging in more 
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reflection on their own thoughts (metacognitive reflection), they are less likely to clearly 
understand those thoughts (metacognitive insight), less likely to give reflective responses when 
solving problems (CRT), and (possibly) more likely to engage in intuitive reasoning processes.  
Impulsiveness significantly and negatively predicted metacognitive insight and Need for 
Cognition across both Study 1 and Study 2 and did not significantly predict CRT scores or Faith 
in Intuition in either study. Impulsiveness significantly and negatively predicted metacognitive 
reflection in Study 2, though this was not true for Study 1. This inconsistent pattern was also 
present at the level of the bivariate correlations (i.e., significant and negative in Study 2; 
nonsignificant and positive in Study 1) suggesting a possible difference across samples. Lastly, 
impulsiveness was not related to overconfidence. Taken together, these results strongly suggest 
that, while self-reported impulsiveness does not predict CRT performance, intellectual 
overconfidence, or preference for intuitive thinking (Faith in Intuition), people who are higher in 
impulsiveness are less likely to reflect on their own thoughts (metacognitive reflection), less 
likely to enjoy engaging in intellectually reflective activities (Need for Cognition), and less likely 
to experience clarity of understanding when they do engage in reflection (metacognitive insight).  
General Discussion 
 Across three studies, we found evidence that both narcissism and trait impulsiveness are 
significantly associated with the propensity to engage in various aspects of cognitive reflection. 
Specifically, individuals who are higher in grandiose narcissism are more likely to report that 
they enjoy engaging in effortful cognitive endeavours yet also more likely to be overconfident in 
(i.e., overestimate) their own cognitive ability. We also found some (mixed) evidence that 
individuals higher in vulnerable narcissism may be less likely to engage in cognitive reflection 
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when solving reasoning problems (i.e., the Cognitive Reflection Test) and may be more likely to 
prefer engaging in intuitive reasoning processes (though future research will need to be 
conducted to verify the strength of these associations). Additionally, though individuals higher in 
vulnerable narcissism are more likely to reflect on their own thoughts, feelings, and behaviours 
(i.e., metacognitive reflection), they are also significantly less likely to have a clear, coherent 
understanding of those thoughts, feelings, and behaviours (i.e., metacognitive insight). Lastly, we 
found consistent evidence that individuals higher in trait impulsiveness are significantly less 
likely to reflect on their own thoughts, feelings, and behaviours, less likely to have a clear, 
coherent understanding of their own cognitive content, and less likely to engage in and enjoy 
cognitively effortful activities. In the following, we expand upon and provide broader context for 
these findings. 
Narcissism and Cognitive Reflection 
The present results offer new insights into the relations between dispositional characteristics and 
cognitive reflection (as articulated by contemporary dual process models of cognition). 
Specifically, despite grandiose narcissism negatively predicting verbal intelligence and appearing 
to have, at best, a small negative association with performance on reflective reasoning tasks 
(when controlling for cognitive ability), grandiose narcissists are significantly and consistently 
overconfident in their own cognitive ability. Indeed, people higher in grandiose narcissism are 
also more likely to claim that they engage in and enjoy intellectually effortful endeavours that 
require rational, logical thinking processes (i.e., they report a higher Need for Cognition). These 
findings support prior research highlighting grandiose narcissists’ proclivity to overestimate their 
intelligence (Gabriel, Citrelli, & Ee, 1994), display more arrogance and feelings of superiority, 
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and regulate their egos through self-enhancement and denial of weaknesses (Dickinson & 
Pincus, 2003; Miller et al, 2010).  
This combination of overconfidence and superiority could be a key limiting factor in the 
propensity of individuals higher in grandiose narcissism to engage in Type II (reflective) 
processes. For instance, according to a reasoning model proposed by Thompson, Prowse-Turner, 
and Pennycook (2011), quick, intuitive responses are accompanied by a metacognitive 
experience of confidence in the correctness of the answer, known as a “Feeing of Rightness” 
(FOR). Based on the results presented here, as well as past work showing consistent associations 
between grandiose narcissism and overconfidence (Macenczak, et al., 2016), it could be the case 
that individuals higher in grandiose narcissism experience significantly and consistently biased 
FORs across a broad range of reasoning tasks. Additionally, separate lines of research have 
found that less awareness of the fallibility of one’s own intuitive judgments as well as a greater 
tendency to reject corrective feedback are traits common both to narcissistic and to overconfident 
individuals (De Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; Freis, et al., 2015; Kahneman & Klein, 
2009; Macenczak, et al., 2016; Sieck & Arkes, 2005). Given this, it may be especially difficult 
for more narcissistic individuals to update and properly calibrate their FORs for certain 
reasoning tasks. When viewed through this lens, grandiose narcissists’ seemingly contradictory 
perception that they are individuals who regularly engage in and enjoy intellectual, logical 
thinking activities - despite the miscalibration of their performance in such activities - may be 
either a reflection of their broader overconfidence or an overt, ego-driven self-enhancement 
strategy. Taken together, these results suggest that, while grandiose narcissists may view 
themselves as highly intellectual, critical thinkers, their excessive overconfidence in their own 
mental prowess is likely unwarranted. 
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Individuals higher in vulnerable narcissism performed significantly worse on a reflective 
reasoning task (i.e., CRT). One potential explanation for this finding is that vulnerable 
narcissism is strongly related to neuroticism (Miller et al, 2018). Neuroticism has been found to 
be strongly associated with impulsiveness (Lange, Wagner, Müller, & Eggert, 2017) and, as 
noted by Frederick (2005), CRT scores reflect one’s ability to resist disinhibited responses. 
However, the relation between vulnerable narcissism and CRT scores was significant even when 
controlling for impulsiveness, and trait impulsiveness did not significantly predict CRT scores. 
That said, it is possible we are not exhaustively measuring “inhibitory control.” 
Additionally, though individuals higher in vulnerable narcissism were more likely to 
report that they reflect on their own thoughts and feelings, they were also less likely to report 
clearly understanding those thoughts and feelings, and we found some evidence that they may be 
more likely to rely on intuitive thinking when making decisions. These results may seem 
counterintuitive but are again consistent with the idea that vulnerable narcissists tend to be highly 
neurotic (Miller et al, 2018), which is positively associated with more negative, ruminative 
aspects of self-reflection (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) and negatively related to clarity in 
understanding certain self-reflective cognitions (i.e., insight; Campbell et al., 1996). 
Additionally, vulnerable narcissists tend to have lower self-esteem and lower perceptions of self-
efficacy (Brookes, 2015). Therefore, it could be the case that when vulnerable narcissists detect 
conflict related to an intuitive response (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015) and attempt to 
engage in cognitive reflection, they experience self-doubt in their own decisional competence, 
which prompts them to disengage from reflection and revert to their initial “gut instinct.” Taken 
together, these results seem consistent with the more neurotic characteristics of rumination and 
appear to suggest that, while vulnerable narcissists may report that they reflect on their own 
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thoughts, feelings, and actions, they often lack the metacognitive clarity to understand those 
reflective cognitions and, in some cases, may not possess sufficient self-confidence to effectively 
or consistently engage in cognitive reflection when faced with tasks that require it, instead 
relying on less rational, intuitive thinking processes.  
Impulsiveness and Cognitive Reflection 
Individuals scoring higher in impulsiveness were less likely to reflect on their own thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviours (i.e., metacognitive reflection), less likely to achieve clarity in 
understanding their own thoughts and behaviours (i.e., metacognitive insight), and less likely to 
enjoy engaging in cognitively effortful endeavours (i.e., Need for Cognition). The fact that 
higher trait impulsiveness was negatively associated with these three aspects of cognitive 
reflection seems consistent, at least conceptually, with the theoretical claims of dual process 
theory, which often associates Type I thinking with fast, impulsive processes and Type 2 with 
slower, more cognitively engaged processes requiring greater executive control (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). Consistent failure to engage in rational, Type II thinking processes has been 
associated with miserly information processing (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014) and “lazy 
thinking” (Pennycook & Rand, 2018). This suggests, at least for certain aspects of cognitive 
reflection, that individuals higher in trait impulsiveness are either unable or unwilling to engage 
in cognitively demanding or challenging tasks. 
It is also interesting to note that, across all studies, impulsiveness consistently failed to 
predict our behavioural measure of cognitive reflection (i.e., the CRT). As defined by Frederick 
(2005), CRT scores represent “the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first 
comes to mind” (p.35). Indeed, recent research has shown that CRT scores are negatively related 
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to delayed discounting measures of impulsivity (Bialek & Sawicki, 2018). Regardless, given that 
trait impulsiveness, as measured by the BIS-11, encompasses various aspects of the proclivity to 
act or make up one’s mind “without thinking” (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995), it is curious 
that it was unrelated to CRT scores in our sample. This seemingly counterintuitive finding could 
be the result of any of several factors. For instance, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) 
might not capture “cognitive impulsivity” (e.g., Jelihovschi, Cardoso, & Linhares, 2018; Patton, 
Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). Additionally, given that impulsiveness was measured via self-report 
in our studies, there exists the possibility that an individual’s belief that he/she is impulsive (in a 
general sense) is not necessarily indicative of actual cognitive or behavioural impulsivity when 
engaged in problem-solving tasks. 
Interrelations between cognitive reflection measures 
CRT scores were positively associated with Need for Cognition, and negatively correlated with 
Faith in Intuition. This lends support to the theoretical intent of the CRT, which was designed to 
measure the extent to which a person can override intuitive responses and engage in reflective 
thinking (Frederick, 2005), and matches prior research showing CRT scores positively related to 
Need for Cognition and negatively related to Faith in Intuition (Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & 
Fugelsang, 2016). Interestingly, CRT scores were not significantly related to metacognitive 
reflection but were positively associated with metacognitive insight. This appears to suggest that 
an individual’s perceived clarity of thought while engaged in reflection is more important for 
successful decision-making than that individual’s belief that he or she is a reflective person. 
Additionally, metacognitive reflection and metacognitive insight were both positively related to 
Need for Cognition, which matches correlations found in past research (Roberts, Heritage, & 
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Gasson, 2015) and underscores the idea that the ability to engage in clear, coherent, reflective 
thought plays an important role in the extent to which one enjoys engaging in intellectually 
rigorous pursuits. These results stand as further evidence that cognitive reflection is not a single, 
homogeneous process but, instead, is better conceptualized as an “umbrella term” encapsulating 
various correlated aspects of Type II thinking processes (Pennycook, De Neys, Evans, Stanovich, 
& Thompson, 2018). Future research might benefit from deeper analysis of this potential 
nomological framework. 
Narcissism as predictor or as outcome of cognitive reflection 
A final issue worth discussing is the directionality of our proposed model. Here, we have 
suggested that personality and dispositional attributes (e.g., narcissism, impulsiveness) can bias 
individuals with respect to their engagement in reflective thinking processes. An alternative view 
would be that a lack of cognitive reflection tends to lead to behaviour consistent with these 
dispositions. For example, an individual who (first) has a low propensity for engaging in 
cognitive reflection might later develop narcissistic traits. The present design, of course, cannot 
distinguish between these two alternatives and, at least in adults, it might be difficult to 
determine which (if either) came first. As such, developmental designs tracking the time course 
that these different personality and cognitive dispositions take would represent a valuable way 
forward. 
That said, the general trend in the relevant literature has been to view dispositional and 
personality attributes as foundational influences on a wide range of subsequent cognitive and 
behavioural outcomes (e.g., Gabriel, Citrelli, & Ee, 1994; Macenczaka, Campbell, Henley, & 
Campbell, 2016; Miller, et al., 2009). Under this view, “engagement in cognitive reflection” 
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would be a specific outcome that extant personality dispositions might reliably predict. Though 
the decision is ultimately an empirical one, in considering this “chicken and egg” dilemma, we 
felt it more plausible and likely that narcissistic eggs make unreflective chickens than the 
opposite being true. 
Conclusion 
The present results demonstrate clearly that narcissism and impulsiveness are significantly 
associated with distinct aspects of cognitive reflection. Notably, these associations seem to be 
unique to each type of narcissism. Indeed, grandiose and vulnerable narcissists differ in their 
performance on problem-solving tasks (i.e., CRT) and preferences for intuitive thinking, as well 
as the degree to which they reflect on and understand their own thoughts and enjoy cognitively 
effortful activities. Additionally, though impulsiveness was significantly related to self-report 
measures of cognitive reflection (i.e., metacognitive reflection, metacognitive insight, and Need 
for Cognition), it showed no association with a behavioural measure of cognitive reflection (i.e., 
CRT scores). These results extend the dual processes paradigm by demonstrating that certain 
individual differences in dispositional and personality characteristics may play important roles in 
the extent to which individuals engage in specific decision-making strategies.  
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Table 1           
Study 1 descriptive and correlational data for all study variables.      
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Grandiose narcissism 2.62 3.11 (.85)        
2 Vulnerable narcissism 28.32 8.48 .12  (.81)       
3 Impulsiveness 1.86 .40 .07      .40** (.90)      
4 CRT-L 4.26 1.82  -.21* -.02   -.08  (.79)     
5 Metacognitive Reflection 4.13 1.28  -.02    .19    .05   -.07   (.97)    
6 Metacognitive Insight 4.77 0.94  -.07      -.45**   -.54** .04    .08   (.90)   
7 Need for Cognition 3.79 0.81 .01    -.32**   -.58** .06   .29**   .31** (.95)  
8 Faith in Intuition 3.18 .86 .03 -.17   -.10    -.34** .22*   .26** .10 (.96) 
 Note: N = 100. CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test - Long. Cronbach's coefficient scale reliabilities are italicized 
diagonally. **p < .01; *p < .05 
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Table 2 











Grandiose narcissism  -.21* -.01 -.00  .06  .05 
Vulnerable narcissism  .05  .21     -.28** -.11 -.15 
Impulsiveness -.09  -.03     -.42**     -.54** -.05 
Adjusted R2 .02 .00 .33 .33 .00 
F 1.75a 1.27a 17.53** 17.34** 1.04a 
Note: N = 100. Standardized beta coefficients listed. CRT-L = Cognitive Reflection Test - Long;     
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Table 3             
Studies 2a and 2b combined descriptive and correlational data for all study variables.      
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Grandiose narcissism 2.29 2.71 (.81)          
2 Vulnerable narcissism 28.90 8.25   .30** (.81)         
3 Impulsiveness 1.93 0.40    .26** .43** (.88)        
4 CRT-L 3.84 2.04   -.19*    -.18**  -.26**  (.83)       
5 Metacognitive Reflection 4.14 1.20     .01    .19** -.27**  -.04      (.96)      
6 Metacognitive Insight 4.69 0.89   -.22**  -.40**  -.58**  .27** .11*   (.87)     
7 Need for Cognition 3.68 0.85 -.01    -.23**  -.56**  .36** .35** .39** (.95)    
8 Faith in Intuition 3.22 0.76 .03   .15** .11*  -.18**  .14** .06    -.12*    (.93)   
9 Numeracy 47.49a 33.38 -.04    -.02     -.17**  .56** .00    .13*  .28** -.19**  (.64)  
10 Verbal intelligence 71.77a 19.78   -.35**  -.12**  -.27**  .44** .03    .31** .27** -.19**  .39** (.71) 
 Note: N = 378. a denotes percent correct score; CRT-L = Cognitive Reflection Test - Long; Cronbach's coefficient scale reliabilities are 
italicized diagonally. **p < .01; *p < .05 
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Table 4  
Multiple linear regressions for each cognitive reflection outcome variable  






Faith in     
Intuition 
Predictor variables          
Grandiose narcissism -.05     .00     -.01          .21***   -.08      
Vulnerable narcissism   -.11*         .37***      -.19***         -.05           .15**   
Impulsiveness -.06         -.43***        -.45***    -.43*** -.00      
Covariates          
Numeracy       .47*** -.06              -.02         .14**   -.13*    
Verbal intelligence       .21*** -.02            .17***    .14**   -.15*    
Adjusted R2 .39    .17    .38    .38    .06    
F   48.67***   16.36***   46.52***   47.04***     5.96*** 
Note: N = 378. Standardized beta coefficients listed. CRT-L = Cognitive Reflection Test-Long;    
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
 
 
Table 5   
Study 2b descriptive and correlational data for 
overconfidence measures 






 M 12.74 10.09 
 SD 25.68 17.70 
 Correlations   
1 Grandiose narcissism     .27**    .38** 
2 Vulnerable narcissism  .05    .05    
3 Impulsiveness .10    .13    
4 CRT-L    -.27**    -.29**  
5 Metacognitive Reflection -.02      .02    
6 Metacognitive Insight -.13         -.21**  
7 Need for Cognition -.08     -.12     
8 Faith in Intuition  .00     .05    
9 Numeracy     -.65**     -.32**  
10 Verbal intelligence     -.43**     -.80**  
Note: N = 190. **p < .01; *p < .05  
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Table 6   
Multiple linear regressions for overconfidence predicted 
by narcissism and impulsiveness 




Predictor variables   
Grandiose narcissism      .19***       .15*** 
Vulnerable 
narcissism 
.01      -.02       
Impulsiveness          -.09       -.07       
Covariates   
Numeracy      -.60*** .04      
Verbal intelligence -.11            -.78*** 
Adjusted R2 .47     .65     
F    34.20***    70.39*** 
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The foregoing supplementary materials include separate descriptive statistic tables for Studies 2a 
and 2b. 
Table S1 
Multiple linear regressions for each cognitive reflection outcome variable (Study 1 replication) 








Grandiose narcissism  -.12*        -.01 -.04     .17**       -.03 
Vulnerable narcissism  -.06  .37**     -.18** -.03  .13* 
Impulsiveness  -.20** -.41**     -.49**     -.60** .06 
Adjusted R2  .09          .17 .36 .33 .02 
F 11.75      26.63** 70.66** 63.76** 3.23* 
Note: N = 378. Standardized beta coefficients listed. CRT-L = Cognitive Reflection Test - Long;   








M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Grandiose narcissism 2.04 2.70 (.83)
2 Vulnerable narcissism 28.54 8.27   .32** (.80)
3 Impulsiveness 1.90 0.38   .32**    .48** (.88)
4 CRT-L 4.09 1.87 -.09     -.22**  -.22** (.79)
5 Metacognitive Reflection 4.19 1.13 -.06    .19*   -.21** -.10   (.96)
6 Metacognitive Insight 4.77 0.89   -.27**   -.39**  -.55**   .21** .13  (.86)
7 Need for Cognition 3.74 0.80 -.03     -.34**  -.59**   .30**   .24**   .41** (.95)
8 Faith in Intuition 3.23 0.79 .06   .16*  .17* -.18* .12  .06  -.12   (.93)
9 Numeracy 50.00a 31.13 .05  -.00 -.11   .45** .01  .05    .25**  -.21** (.57)
10 Verbal intelligence 71.81a 18.98   -.36**   -.18**  -.30**   .42** .02    .24**   .26**  -.28**   .30** (.67)
Table S2
Note: N  = 188. a denotes percent correct score; CRT-L = Cognitive Reflection Test - Long; Cronbach's coefficient 
scale reliabilities are italicized diagonally. **p < .01; *p < .05
Study 2a descriptive and correlational data for all study variables.
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Table S3  
Study 2a multiple linear regressions for each cognitive reflection outcome variables 






Faith in     
Intuition 
Predictor variables          
Grandiose narcissism .05   -.08     -.06       .22**  -.06     
Vulnerable narcissism -.16*      .39**   -.15*  -.13     .11    
Impulsiveness -.03       -.39**      -.45**     -.55**   .05    
Covariates          
Numeracy     .36**  -.01    -.01    .14* -.14     
Verbal intelligence     .29**  -.05    .06   .11      -.23*      
Adjusted R2 .30   .13  .31  .41  .09   
F 17.34**     6.71**  18.12**      26.74**       4.73** 
Note: N = 188. Standardized beta coefficients listed. CRT-L = Cognitive Reflection Test-Long;    
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Table S5  
Study 2b multiple linear regressions for each cognitive reflection outcome variable 





Faith in     
Intuition 
Predictor variables          
Grandiose narcissism -.12   .07   .10       .22*** -.08      
Vulnerable narcissism -.06        .34***     -.26***    .02        .17*     
Impulsiveness -.08        -.45***      -.45***   -.51*** -.05      
Covariates          
Numeracy     .54*** -.10       -.05       .14*    -.16*      
Verbal intelligence   .14**  .01        .28***  .15*   -.07      
Adjusted R2 .45   .18   .44   .35   .03    
F 31.45***   9.44*** 30.28***     21.12***     2.26      
Note: N = 190. Standardized beta coefficients listed. CRT-L = Cognitive Reflection Test - Long; 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
 
 
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Grandiose narcissism 2.49 2.66 (.78)
2 Vulnerable narcissism 29.33 8.21 .29** (.82)
3 Impulsiveness 1.96 0.41 .18**  .38** (.89)
4 CRT-L 3.63 2.16 -.24** -.15*  -.27** (.86)
5 Metacognitive Reflection 4.09 1.27 .09     .19** -.29** -.01    (.97)
6 Metacognitive Insight 4.63 0.88 -.15** -.42** -.59**  .30** .08   (.86)
7 Need for Cognition 3.62 0.90 .07   -.13   -.53**  .38** .44**  .36** (.96)
8 Faith in Intuition 3.21 0.73 -.01    .14  .05  -.20** .16*   .05   -.12     (.93)
9 Numeracy 45.40a 35.29 -.10    -.03   -.21**  .63** -.02     .18*  .30** -.18* (.70)
10 Verbal intelligence 72.16a 20.13 -.33** -.07   -.23**  .44** .02    .36** .27** -.11  .46** (.75)
11 Numeracy confidence 58.13 26.89 .13   .01  -.18*   .57** -.04    .11   .32**   -.23** .69** .19** -
12 Numeracy overconfidence 12.74 25.68 .27** .05  .10   -.27** -.02    -.13    -.08     .00 -.65** -.43** .10    -
13 Verbal confidence 82.25 12.31 .02   -.04    -.20**  .31** .06     .29** .27** -.11 .29** .49** .41** .04    -
14 Verbal overconfidence 10.09 17.70 .38** .05  .13    -.29** .02    -.21** -.12    .05 -.32** -.80** .07    .51** .14  
Table S4
Study 2b descriptive and correlational data for all study variables.
Note: N  = 190. a denotes percent correct score; CRT-L = Cognitive Reflection Test - Long; Cronbach's coefficient scale reliabilities are 
italicized diagonally. **p < .01; *p < .05
